Skip to main content

๐—ฃ๐—ฎ๐—ฟ๐˜ ๐Ÿฏ โ€” ๐—ง๐—ต๐—ฒ ๐—”๐—–๐—” ๐—œ๐—ป๐—ณ๐—น๐—ฒ๐—ฐ๐˜๐—ถ๐—ผ๐—ป: ๐—›๐—ผ๐˜„ ๐— ๐—Ÿ๐—ฅ ๐—ฅ๐˜‚๐—น๐—ฒ๐˜€, ๐—ฆ๐˜๐—ฎ๐—ฟ๐˜€ ๐—ฅ๐—ฎ๐˜๐—ถ๐—ป๐—ด๐˜€, ๐—ฎ๐—ป๐—ฑ ๐—ฅ๐—ถ๐˜€๐—ธ ๐—”๐—ฑ๐—ท๐˜‚๐˜€๐˜๐—บ๐—ฒ๐—ป๐˜ ๐—Ÿ๐—ผ๐—ฐ๐—ธ๐—ฒ๐—ฑ ๐—ฃ๐—ฎ๐˜†๐—ฒ๐—ฟ๐˜€ ๐—œ๐—ป๐˜๐—ผ ๐˜๐—ต๐—ฒ ๐—ง๐—ฟ๐—ฎ๐—ฝ

By 2010, health plans had already cycled through two decades of demand-side strategies: utilization controls in the 1980sโ€“1990s, and claims-based analytics in the 2000s. Neither produced durable economics.

The Affordable Care Act was supposed to reset the trajectory. Instead, it institutionalized the treadmill.

The MLR Rule: Guardrails That Missed the Point

The Medical Loss Ratio (MLR) rule set fixed thresholds (80% for individual/small group, 85% for large group) requiring plans to spend most premium revenue on clinical care and โ€œquality improvement.โ€

The logic was straightforward: limit administrative profit-taking and force reinvestment into care.

But in practice:

Plans redirected enormous resources into projects that qualified as โ€œqualityโ€ under CMS definitions โ€” Stars infrastructure, vendor-driven gap closure, and member engagement programs.

These activities consumed billions but rarely bent underlying cost trends.

Worse, the rule created an administrative ceiling that squeezed operational flexibility while doing little to change the economics of chronic disease.

The discipline was supposed to come from spending thresholds. What it created was entrenched administrative inflation.

๐—ฆ๐˜๐—ฎ๐—ฟ๐˜€ ๐—ฅ๐—ฎ๐˜๐—ถ๐—ป๐—ด๐˜€: ๐—œ๐—ป๐—ฐ๐—ฒ๐—ป๐˜๐—ถ๐˜ƒ๐—ฒ๐˜€ ๐—ง๐—ต๐—ฎ๐˜ ๐——๐—ถ๐˜€๐˜๐—ผ๐—ฟ๐˜๐—ฒ๐—ฑ ๐—ฆ๐˜๐—ฟ๐—ฎ๐˜๐—ฒ๐—ด๐˜†

The ACA tied Medicare Advantage profitability to Stars Ratings and Quality Bonus Payments (QBP). The intention was to link revenue to performance.

Plans responded rationally:

  • They built entire Stars departments dedicated to HEDIS gap closure, medication adherence, and CAHPS survey improvement.
  • Vendors proliferated, offering point solutions to incrementally boost scores.
  • Billions were spent each year, much of it duplicative, all chasing marginal gains in ratings.

But this strategy was brittle. When CMS raised the cut points in 2025, ratings dropped precipitously. Infrastructure designed for scoring couldnโ€™t adapt, because it was never designed to produce structural improvement.

Stars became the most expensive distraction in payer history, chasing optics while margins eroded.

๐—ฅ๐—ถ๐˜€๐—ธ ๐—”๐—ฑ๐—ท๐˜‚๐˜€๐˜๐—บ๐—ฒ๐—ป๐˜: ๐—ฅ๐—ฒ๐˜ƒ๐—ฒ๐—ป๐˜‚๐—ฒ ๐—ฃ๐—ฟ๐—ผ๐˜๐—ฒ๐—ฐ๐˜๐—ถ๐—ผ๐—ป ๐—ช๐—ถ๐˜๐—ต๐—ผ๐˜‚๐˜ ๐—ข๐˜‚๐˜๐—ฐ๐—ผ๐—บ๐—ฒ๐˜€

Risk adjustment was the third leg of the stool. Properly designed, it should balance payments across populations with different risk profiles.

But under ACA-era incentives, it became a revenue protection mechanism:

  • Plans invested heavily in retrospective chart reviews, home assessments, and HCC optimization programs.
  • Provider workflows were repurposed around diagnosis capture rather than prevention.
  • The system rewarded documentation intensity, not improved clinical outcomes.
  • Margins were protected, but only on paper. The economics were fragile because they depended on coding, not health.

๐—ง๐—ต๐—ฒ ๐—ง๐—ฟ๐—ฎ๐—ฝ ๐——๐—ฒ๐—ณ๐—ถ๐—ป๐—ฒ๐—ฑ

Taken together, the ACA reforms entrenched demand-side behaviors:

  • MLR cemented administrative inflation.
  • Stars locked payers into score-chasing.
  • Risk adjustment incentivized documentation over prevention.

This was the inflection point where health plans stopped experimenting and started entrenching. The treadmill became business model.

๐—ช๐—ต๐˜† ๐—œ๐˜ ๐— ๐—ฎ๐˜๐˜๐—ฒ๐—ฟ๐˜€ ๐—ณ๐—ผ๐—ฟ ๐—Ÿ๐—ฒ๐—ฎ๐—ฑ๐—ฒ๐—ฟ๐˜€ ๐—ง๐—ผ๐—ฑ๐—ฎ๐˜†

Margins in Medicare Advantage and Medicaid managed care are under unprecedented pressure. Utilization is up. Benchmarks are tightening. Administrative overhead is higher than ever.

And yet, the dominant strategies in play are still the same ACA-era tools: MLR projects, Stars campaigns, and risk adjustment programs. Executives know the economics donโ€™t add up. But the treadmill keeps running.

The ACA didnโ€™t fail because it was poorly intentioned. It failed because it doubled down on demand-side levers that could never scale into sustainable economics.

The way forward isnโ€™t to optimize the treadmill. Itโ€™s to step off it and build a supply-side engine that creates new inputs, real-time risk visibility, and economics that hold regardless of how CMS redraws the lines.

Contact Us

Better health outcomes are possible. Letโ€™s talk about how MyRoad.io can help you achieve them.

Name*(Required)